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I. INTRODUCTION 
Congress passed the Drug Price Competition and Patent Term 
Restoration Act of 1984 (Hatch-Waxman Act) to help lower the cost of 
drugs for the public and to encourage investment in research and 
development of new drugs.1  The Hatch-Waxman Act was a compromise 
that aimed to fulfill two goals: to extend patents for name-brand (pioneer) 
drug companies and to ease FDA approval for generic drug companies to 
enter the market.2  Decades later, commentators praise the Hatch-Waxman 
Act for creating the generic pharmaceutical industry.3 
Although the purpose of the Hatch-Waxman Act was to increase 
competition between pioneer and generic drug companies, pioneer drug 
                                                          
 1. See Colleen Kelly, The Balance Between Innovation and Competition: The 
Hatch-Waxman Act, the 2003 Amendments, and Beyond, 66 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 417, 
421 (2011) (predicting generic drugs would save American consumers $920 million). 
 2. See id. (explaining that there were 150 pioneer drugs in the market with no 
generic versions). 
 3. See Matthew Avery, Note, Continuing Abuse of the Hatch-Waxman Act by 
Pharmaceutical Patent Holders and the Failure of the 2003 Amendments, 60 HASTINGS 
L.J. 171, 175-76 (2008) (detailing that the Act also ensured the quality of generic drugs 
and eliminated research costs for duplicate clinical trials). 
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companies began making settlements with generic drug companies called 
“reverse payment” agreements that effectively delay competition.4  Reverse 
payment agreements allowed the pioneer drug company to retain its 
monopoly on the market by delaying generic drug entry, and thus made the 
Hatch-Waxman Act ineffective in bringing competition to that particular 
drug market.5 
Under the Sherman Act, the antitrust analysis for patent antitrust claims 
is complex because the purpose of patent law—to grant a legal 
monopoly—contradicts the purpose of antitrust law—to prevent a 
monopoly.6  To balance both laws, courts use the rule of reason analysis in 
patent antitrust claims to determine whether a practice or agreement that 
exploits the patent is an unreasonable restraint on trade.7 
Courts were split on whether reverse payment agreements under the 
Hatch-Waxman Act violated the Sherman Antitrust Act and applied three 
different analyses to determine whether a violation had occurred.8  Some 
courts followed the precedent of most Sherman Antitrust patent cases and 
used the general antitrust analysis of rule of reason to determine whether 
reverse payment agreements were an unreasonable restraint to trade.9  
Other courts held reverse payment agreements as per se illegal agreements 
and banned them all together.10  Lastly, some courts moved away from both 
the rule of reason analysis and the per se illegal designation and instead 
applied a scope of the patent analysis, which permits the patent holder to 
maintain a monopoly on an invalid or expired patent.11 
This Comment argues that the Supreme Court was correct in holding that 
                                                          
 4. See id. at 181 (describing the settlement between a pioneer and generic drug 
company that result in the generic delaying marketing of its generic equivalent until a 
later date). 
 5. See Kelly, supra note 1, at 432 (describing pioneer drug companies as 
“gaming” the Hatch-Waxman Act to their advantage and delaying generic drug 
competition). 
 6. See In re K-Dur Antitrust Litig., 686 F.3d 197, 216 (3d Cir. 2012) (recognizing 
that the court must proceed with caution because the patent holder possesses a legal 
monopoly). 
 7. See Arizona v. Maricopa Cnty. Med. Soc’y, 457 U.S. 332, 343-44 (1982) 
(explaining that the rule of reason requires a holistic approach that weighs all the 
circumstances surrounding the industry). 
 8. See In re K-Dur, 686 F.3d at 209, 210-14, 217 (describing the varying 
precedent from five other circuits, and applying a form of rule of reason analysis). 
 9. See Maricopa Cnty. Med. Soc’y, 457 U.S. at 343 (explaining the rule of reason 
is the predominantly used analysis for antitrust cases). 
 10. See In re K-Dur, 686 F.3d at 210-11 (surmising per se illegal designation 
broadly dismisses reverse payment agreements). 
 11. See id. at 212-13 (describing the Second Circuit’s denial of an antitrust claim 
over a reverse payment agreement that occurred after the patent was found invalid). 
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the rule of reason analysis is the best analysis for reverse payment 
agreements because the scope of the patent and per se illegal analyses do 
not provide a balance between patent and antitrust interests.12  Part II 
examines the process of FDA drug approval and the two antitrust analyses 
that are applied to antitrust claims.13  Part II also discusses the varying 
antitrust analyses that courts have applied to reverse payment agreements 
and the most recent case of In re K-Dur.14  Part III argues that the Supreme 
Court was correct to adopt the rule of reason analysis for reverse payment 
antitrust claims because the rule of reason provides the best inquiry that 
incorporates both patent and antitrust law.15  Part III also reviews the faults 
of applying the per se illegal and the scope of the patent analyses and 
argues that these tests do not provide the proper balance between patent 
and antitrust laws.16  Part IV offers policy arguments against reverse 
payment agreements.17  Finally, Part V of this Comment concludes that by 
applying the rule of reason, courts will be able to consistently apply 
antitrust laws to reverse payment antitrust litigation.18 
II. BACKGROUND 
A. How the Hatch-Waxman Act Opened the Market to Generic Drug 
Manufacturers 
The new drug approval process is a long and costly venture, requiring 
the applicant to submit a New Drug Application (NDA) to the FDA that is 
                                                          
 12. See FTC v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S.Ct. 2223, 2238 (2013) (holding the rule of 
reason applied to reverse payment agreements).  The Supreme Court’s decision in 
Actavis was handed down as this Comment was going to press.  Though the Court’s 
decision in regards to the application of the rule of reason is instructive when applied to 
reverse payment agreement cases like In re K-Dur, the analysis presented here will 
more thoroughly explore the various analyses performed by the lower courts and is still 
relevant to show why applying the rule of reason follows legal precedent for patent 
antitrust cases. In re K-Dur, 686 F.3d at 214 (concluding the scope of the patent 
analysis does not apply any antitrust scrutiny because the scope of the patent analysis 
solely focuses on the rights of the patent holder). 
 13. See infra Part II (outlining the FDA drug approval process). 
 14. See infra Part II (describing circuit precedent). 
 15. See infra Part III (arguing the rule of reason is a neutral analysis between the 
scope of the patent and per se illegal analyses). 
 16. See infra Part III (arguing the scope of the patent test is an insufficient antitrust 
analysis). 
 17. See infra Part IV (illustrating how patent drug infringement cases that settle as 
a result of reverse payment agreements are allowing monopolies on patents that should 
have been made invalid, and thus hindering competition). 
 18. See infra Part V (concluding the rule of reason provides a necessary balance 
between patent law and antitrust law). 
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comprised of preclinical and clinical data to demonstrate the safety and 
effectiveness of the drug for human consumption.19  Prior to the Hatch-
Waxman Act, if a generic brand was similar in effectiveness to a new drug, 
the FDA still required the generic manufacturer to spend millions of dollars 
conducting its own research and collecting data for a separate full NDA.20 
The Hatch-Waxman Act opened the door to generic drug manufacturers 
by shortening the process and reducing FDA approval costs.21  The full 
NDA requirement was changed to an Abbreviated New Drug Application 
(ANDA) that allowed a bioequivalent generic drug to gain approval merely 
by demonstrating the generic drug was as safe and effective as the original 
drug.22  In addition to filing the ANDA, the applicant must certify the 
application under a paragraph IV, which declares that the new drug does 
not infringe any patent listed with the FDA.23  When a generic 
manufacturer submits a paragraph IV certification, it must send notice to 
each listed patent owner impacted.24  Upon filing the ANDA and the 
certification, the patent holder has forty-five days to initiate an 
infringement suit against the applicant.25  Upon the filing of an 
infringement suit, an automatic stay will prevent the FDA from approving 
the generic drug until the earlier of thirty months or a court hearing that 
finds the patent has not been infringed or is invalid.26  At the dismissal of 
the automatic stay and upon the approval by the FDA, the generic brand 
receives a 180-day exclusivity period where it is the only generic 
manufacturer that can market the product.27  Only the first generic 
                                                          
 19. See Andrx Pharms., Inc. v. Biovail Corp. Int’l, 256 F.3d 799, 801 (D.C. Cir. 
2001) (declaring “[a]n NDA is time consuming and costly to prepare”); see also Kelly, 
supra note 1, at 420 (describing the paperwork for an NDA and describing that generic 
drug applicants do not have to apply for similar drug approval). 
 20. See Kelly, supra note 1, at 420-22 (explaining the cost of clinical trials was a 
major hindrance to generic manufacturers). 
 21. See C. Scott Hemphill, Paying for Delay: Pharmaceutical Patent Settlement as 
a Regulatory Design Problem, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1553, 1565 (2006) (reporting the cost 
for an Abbreviated New Drug Application (ANDA) reduced the cost of FDA approval 
from over two hundred million dollars to one million dollars). 
 22. See Kelly, supra note 1, at 420-21 (explaining the retesting of the generic drug 
was also found unethical because it required that some patients receive placebos and 
not effective treatment). 
 23. See 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(A)(vii)(IV) (2012) (“[Su]ch patent is invalid or will 
not be infringed by the manufacture, use, or sale of the new drug for which the 
application is submitted[.]”). 
 24. See id. § 355(j)(2)(B)(iii)(I) (requiring notice to each patent owner that is 
subject to the certification). 
 25. See id. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iii). 
 26. See id.  
 27. See id. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iv). 
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manufacturer who submits a paragraph IV certification receives the 
exclusivity period, and they may use it at their sole discretion.28 
Theoretically, the Hatch-Waxman Act would allow generic 
manufacturers to spend fewer resources to enter the market.29  However, in 
actuality, pioneer manufacturers were taking advantage of the Hatch-
Waxman Act to delay product release through agreements made between 
them and generic manufacturers.30  A generic manufacturer that filed an 
ANDA would eventually settle the patent infringement suit with the 
pioneer manufacturer and agree to not market its product in return for 
payment.31  These settlements became known as reverse payment 
agreements.32  The agreements often required that the generic manufacturer 
maintain its 180-day exclusion right to bar the FDA from approving other 
generic drugs of the same bioequivalence.33  This allowed the pioneer drug 
company to maintain a de facto monopoly on the market beyond the patent 
expiration.34  Reverse payment agreements eventually caught the attention 
of Congress, prompting it to change the statute to require that drug 
companies file the settlement agreements for review of possible antitrust 
issues.35 
B. Standard Antitrust Scrutiny 
Antitrust law stems from the Sherman Act that forbids any contract or 
agreement that restrains trade or commerce in the United States.36  The 
                                                          
 28. See id. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iv)(II)(bb) (describing the first applicant as the first one 
who submits an application containing a certification under paragraph (2)(A)(vii)(IV)). 
 29. See Kelly, supra note 1, at 421 (articulating the generic manufacturer could 
now challenge the validity of a drug patent at a reduced cost). 
 30. See Legislative and Regulatory Responses to the FTC Study on Barriers to 
Entry in the Pharmaceutical Marketplace Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 108th 
Cong. 4-5 (2003) [hereinafter Judiciary] (statement of Timothy J. Muris, Chairman, 
Federal Trade Commission) (arguing that reverse payment agreements were delaying 
generic drug entry into the market). 
 31. See Kelly, supra note 1, at 431 (describing the general practice uses reverse 
payments to delay generic drug entry into the market). 
 32. See id. (providing, as an alternative name, “pay-for-delay”). 
 33. See id. (noting that generic companies agreed not to challenge the patent or 
market the generic in exchange for payments). 
 34. See id. (arguing that asserting its 180-day exclusion rights near the expiration 
of the patent allowed the pioneer company to block entry of other generic companies 
for at most 180 days). 
 35. See id. at 437 (explaining the 2003 Amendment to the Hatch-Waxman Act 
required the parties to file copies of the settlement agreement with the FTC and 
Department of Justice). 
 36. See 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2010) (declaring, in plain language, every contract that 
restrains trade or commerce amongst the states is illegal); see also State Oil Co. v. 
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statute is interpreted to outlaw only unreasonable restraints using a rule of 
reason analysis for most antitrust claims.37  Under the rule of reason 
analysis, the court weighs a variety of factors, including specific 
information about the relevant business, the condition of the business 
before and after the restraint was imposed, and the restraint’s history, 
nature, and effect, to determine whether the questioned practice is an 
unreasonable restraint on trade.38 
Restraint of trade can be deemed unlawful per se if the court can predict 
the harmful anticompetitive effect of the restraint and identify only limited 
pro-competitive benefits.39  Per se antitrust is applicable when the court is 
reasonably able to predict that the practice will restrict competition and 
decrease output.40  The Supreme Court has categorized practices such as 
horizontal price-fixing as illegal per se because the probability of the 
anticompetitive nature of the practice is high.41 
C. Hatch-Waxman Antitrust Analysis 
Prior to In re K-Dur in the Third Circuit, sister circuits reviewed antitrust 
claims against reverse payment agreements and applied varying antitrust 
analyses, including a newly defined scope of the patent analysis that was 
created just for patents under the Hatch-Waxman Act.42  The various 
antitrust analyses resulted in differing outcomes on the same or similar 
facts.43 
                                                          
Khan, 522 U.S. 3, 10 (1997) (establishing the Sherman Act as the antitrust standard). 
 37. See Khan, 522 U.S. at 10 (explaining precedent only applies rule of reason and 
per se illegal analyses). 
 38. See Bd. of Trade of Chi. v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918). 
 39. See Kahn, 522 U.S. at 10 (stating that “predictable and pernicious 
anticompetitive” restraints are per se illegal). 
 40. See Arizona v. Maricopa Cty. Med. Soc’y, 457 U.S. 332, 343-44 (1982) 
(asserting a per se illegal analysis permits courts to confidently predict that the rule of 
reason will condemn the restraint of trade); see also Broad. Music, Inc. v. Columbia 
Broad. Sys. Inc., 441 U.S. 1, 19-20 (1979) (concluding the blanket license did not 
facially appear to be one that would always or almost always tend to restrict 
competition and decrease output). 
 41. See NCAA v. Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. 85, 100-01 (1984) (defining horizontal 
price-fixing as an agreement between competitors that sets a nonnegotiable price on a 
good). 
 42. See In re K-Dur Antitrust Litig., 686 F.3d 197, 210, 218 (3d Cir. 2012) 
(holding that the rule of reason applied); In re Cardizem CD Antitrust Litig., 332 F.3d 
896, 907 (6th Cir. 2003) (holding per se illegal analysis applied); Valley Drug Co. v. 
Geneva Pharm., 344 F.3d 1294, 1310 (11th Cir. 2003), cert. denied, 543 U.S. 939 
(2004) (applying the scope of the patent analysis to reverse payment agreements). 
 43. Compare In re K-Dur, 686 F.3d at 211-12 (citing Valley Drug, 344 F.3d at 
1294) (using the rule of reason to find the reverse payment agreement between 
7
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1. Rule of Reason Analysis 
In antitrust cases, courts typically apply the rule of reason analysis, 
which is more deferential than the per se illegal analysis.44  Under the rule 
of reason, the court will look at factors such as the industry and its 
condition prior to and after the restraint; the nature, history, and effect of 
the restraint; and the purpose of the restraint intended by the actor.45  
Courts will weigh the pro-competitive effects against the anticompetitive 
effects to determine whether the restraint is unreasonable.46 
In the context of a patent, the purpose of a restraint agreement becomes 
more influential to the fact finder because patents already provide a right to 
exclude, and the court will not interfere with that right.47  The agreement 
and the actions of the parties to the agreement are factors to determine the 
actual purpose or intent of the settlement.48  Any acts by the parties that 
hinder competition upon signing the settlement can disprove any original 
intent posed during the negotiations.49 
2. Per Se Illegal Analysis 
Certain agreements are categorized as per se illegal because their effect 
on competition is so harmful and without any valued benefit that they 
automatically violate the Sherman Act.50  The per se illegal analysis comes 
                                                          
Schering and generic brands did violate the Sherman Act), with Schering-Plough Corp. 
v. FTC, 402 F.3d 1056, 1076 (11th Cir. 2005) (holding that under the scope of the 
patent analysis, the reverse payment agreement between Schering and generic brand 
drugs did not violate the Sherman Act). 
 44. See Maricopa Cty. Med. Soc’y, 457 U.S. at 344 (explaining the per se illegal 
rule may invalidate some agreements that would be upheld under the rule of reason 
analysis). 
 45. See Bd. of Trade of Chi. v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918) (asserting 
the legality of an agreement is not a simple determination but requires the consideration 
of many factors). 
 46. See In re-K-Dur, 686 F.3d at 209 (providing that if the plaintiff can show the 
challenged conduct has anti-competitive effects on the market, then the burden to prove 
a sufficiently procompetitive objective shifts to the defendant). 
 47. See United States v. Singer Mfg. Co., 374 U.S. 174, 189-90 (1963) (insisting 
the purpose of the agreement between patent holders to exclude was within the purview 
of the Sherman Act). 
 48. See id. at 190-93 (holding the parties actions clearly established a concerted 
action to restrain trade). 
 49. See id. at 195 (questioning defendant’s procompetitive objective to end 
litigation because defendant sued competitors on behalf of joint parties’ patent’s). 
 50. See Northern Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958) (explaining 
that agreements that have a harmful effect on competition and lack any redeeming 
virtue are unreasonable). 
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under the Sherman Act as applied by the courts.51  The following are 
categorized as per se illegal: price-fixing (horizontal agreements), division 
of markets, group boycotts, and tying arrangements.52 
Reverse payment agreements closely resemble price-fixing in a 
horizontal agreement.53  A horizontal agreement is an agreement between 
direct competitors to allocate shares of the market to minimize 
competition.54  Horizontal agreements usually take the form of direct 
competitors agreeing to set a minimum price (price-fixing) for a product in 
order to eliminate competition.55 
If the practice is not clearly price-fixing, the court reviews factors to 
show that the practice is typically harmful to the market.56  Especially in 
cases where the law allows a monopoly, the court must look at whether 
experience warrants classifying the type of agreement as per se illegal.57  
The court considers the special conditions surrounding the industry and 
determines whether the agreement or practice has some redeeming value in 
the context of the industry.58  The court’s analysis should account for 
Congress’s perspective of the practice and whether adjustments to the law 
were created to prevent the practice.59  When a statute provides a 
monopolistic industry around certain rights, the court cannot deem 
agreements that reasonably enforce those rights as per se illegal.60 
Lastly, to determine whether the agreement requires per se distinction, 
                                                          
 51. See id. 
 52. See id. (finding the negative consequences of these broad activities outweighed 
any positive benefits that may arise). 
 53. See In re Cardizem CD Antitrust Litig., 332 F.3d 896, 900 (6th Cir. 2003) 
(concluding an agreement where the pioneer drug company paid the generic drug 
company to delay market entry was a horizontal agreement). 
 54. See United States v. Topco Assocs., 405 U.S. 596, 608 (1972) (explaining a 
vertical agreement occurs when the competitors are not direct competitors or are on 
different levels of the market). 
 55. See id. at 611-12 (explaining that restraining competition by a private party is 
biased by the party’s own interests, while the same restraint made by Congress 
evaluates the competing interests to come to a resolution that benefits society). 
 56. See Broad. Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broad. Sys. Inc., 441 U.S. 1, 9-10 (1979) 
(finding that two partners agreeing to a price does not always violate the Sherman Act). 
 57. See id. (explaining how conditions in copyright law are sui generis; thus 
recognizing there are particular laws created for the purpose of protecting licensing). 
 58. See id. at 14-15 (explaining that in “unique” markets the circumstances can 
negate a per se finding because the restraint on trade increases competition or makes it 
more efficient). 
 59. See id. at 15-16 (explaining that Congress created a similar copyright licensing 
fee scheme as the plaintiff in question indicating the scheme was pro-competitive). 
 60. See id. at 19 (explaining that copyright laws provide the owner with power to 
restrict use of the copyrighted material and the court must be sensitive to this fact). 
9
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the court must evaluate whether the practice facially appears to usually 
restrict the market and oppress market output, and whether no alternatives 
are available in the market.61  If the agreement increases efficiency and 
market output, and there are alternative products or services in the market, 
the court will not use a per se illegal analysis.62 
Once a practice is held as per se illegal, the analysis requires that the 
practice is automatically deemed illegal.63  The court will not do any 
further review and any benefits from the practice are lost.64  Because the 
per se illegal analysis is so harsh, courts are reluctant to find a per se illegal 
restraint and apply a per se illegal analysis.65 
 3. Scope of the Patent Analysis 
The scope of the patent analysis is a new analysis created by the 
Eleventh Circuit that was developed because of the complexities between 
the legal monopolies granted by patent law and the Hatch-Waxman Act.66  
The analysis is primarily founded under patent law and is overwhelmingly 
in favor of the patent holder.67  Under the scope of the patent analysis, 
courts have held that the pioneer manufacturer’s patent gives it 
exclusionary rights, and the reverse payment agreement is valid if it is 
within those rights.68  In one case where the Eleventh Circuit applied the 
scope of the patent analysis, the court gave directions to review the case in 
light of whether the provisions in the agreement exceeded the scope of the 
exclusionary rights of the patent, and upon review, determine if the acts 
                                                          
 61. See id. at 19-20, 23-24 (concluding the licensing was reasonable because there 
were alternative licensing fees). 
 62. See id. at 20 (finding the license agreement was beneficial to the copyright 
market because it helped efficiency, and the plaintiff had alternatives that were not 
adequately sought). 
 63. See Arizona v. Maricopa Cnty. Med. Soc’y, 457 U.S. 332, 344 (1982) 
(describing the per se distinction as a rule of “general application”). 
 64. See id. (acknowledging that the per se illegal analysis is imperfect because it 
invalidates practices that the rule of reason might uphold). 
 65. See id. (requiring previous court experience with the practice so that the court 
can confidently assume the rule of reason will find it illegal). 
 66. See Valley Drug Co. v. Geneva Pharm., 344 F.3d 1294, 1308 (11th Cir. 2003) 
(holding the agreement did not violate the Sherman Act because the exclusionary effect 
was within the patent expiration date). 
 67. See In re K-Dur Antitrust Litig., 686 F.3d 197, 214 (3d Cir. 2012) (explaining 
the scope of the patent analysis does not use any antitrust scrutiny and no reverse 
payment case has ever gone to trial). 
 68. See Valley Drug, 344 F.3d at 1306-07 (concluding that reverse payment 
agreements were not per se illegal when the agreement was no broader than the patent’s 
exclusionary right). 
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were anticompetitive.69 
The scope of the patent analysis favors patent law over antitrust law 
because it evaluates the patent monopoly as a stand-alone analysis.70  It 
rejects further inquiry into the surrounding factors of the industry and 
precludes antitrust analysis that is generally required in patent antitrust 
claims.71  The scope of the patent analysis results in the court merely basing 
an antitrust claim on patent law.72  The only occasion the court found an 
antitrust violation under a scope of the patent analysis for a reverse 
payment agreement was in Andrx Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Elan Corp.73  In 
Elan Corp., the settlement agreement excluded the generic drug from the 
market beyond the patent expiration date.74  The court found an antitrust 
claim in the agreement because the generic manufacturer agreed to never 
market the generic drug, thus giving the patent holder an unlimited patent 
monopoly.75 
D. Returning to the Rule of Reason: In re K-Dur 
 1. Facts 
The facts of this case arise from an agreement between a pioneer drug 
manufacturer, Schering, and generic manufacturers, Upshur and ESI.76  
Schering created K-Dur and obtained a patent on the controlled-release 
coating of a potassium chloride supplement that is used to treat potassium 
deficiencies.77  In 1995, on separate occasions, two generic manufacturers 
each filed ANDAs that certified their generic drug based on a paragraph IV 
                                                          
 69. See id. at 1312 (stating the prohibition of generic brands, the waiver of the 180-
day exclusivity period, and other provisions require consideration under the scope of 
the patent). 
 70. See In re K-Dur, 686 F.3d at 214 (asserting the scope of the patent analysis 
improperly restricts antitrust law to instances of fraud on the Patent and Trademark 
Office or baseless infringement claims). 
 71. See United States v. Singer Mfg. Co., 374 U.S. 174, 196-97 (1963) (concluding 
antitrust law still applies to patent holders). 
 72. See In re K-Dur, 686 F.3d at 214 (noting the scope of the patent analysis is not 
an antitrust analysis). 
 73. See 421 F.3d 1227, 1235 (11th Cir. 2005) (holding that blocking the generic 
after the patent expired was beyond the scope of the patent exclusion). 
 74. See id. (narrowing the relevant market to controlled release naproxen). 
 75. See id. (explaining the agreement eliminated the competition because the 
defendant was the only supplier). 
 76. See In re K-Dur, 686 F.3d at 205-06 (explaining Upsher was the first generic 
manufacturer to file a paragraph IV certification and ESI filed months later). 
 77. See id. at 203 (noting the patent expired in September 2006). 
11
Ford: Using Reverse Payment Agreements as an Effective Way to Maintain
Published by Digital Commons @ American University Washington College of Law, 2013
930 JOURNAL OF GENDER, SOCIAL POLICY & THE LAW  [Vol. 21:4 
non-infringement claim.78  The first, Upsher, created a generic version of 
K-Dur, and upon defending the patent infringement claim, argued the 
composition of the controlled release coating in its generic version was 
different than Schering’s.79  The litigation ended by settlement, hours 
before the district court would rule on motions for summary judgment.80  In 
the settlement, Upsher did not concede to the validity or the possible 
infringement of the patent, but agreed to delay marketing of its generic 
drug until September 1, 2001.81  Interestingly, Upsher also gave a license to 
Schering to make and sell other drugs in exchange for payments of over 
sixty million dollars over three years.82 
The second agreement between Schering was with another generic drug 
company, ESI, who defended the infringement suit based on their 
controlled release version being a multi-layered coating.83  The patent 
infringement litigation ended when ESI agreed to delay marketing until 
2004 in exchange for an initial payment of five million dollars and future 
payments contingent upon approval of ESI’s ANDA.84 
Various wholesalers and retailers who purchased K-Dur brought antitrust 
claims.85  The district court held that the settlements were only subject to 
antitrust scrutiny if the scope of Schering’s patent was exceeded or the 
underlying patent infringement suits were objectively baseless.86 
 2. Opinion 
On appeal, the Third Circuit reversed.87  The court rejected the scope of 
                                                          
 78. See id. at 205-06 (stating that both generic companies asserted their drugs fell 
outside of the patent because they used different chemical compositions). 
 79. See id. at 205 (describing Upsher’s characterization of the suit as “baseless”). 
 80. See id. (acknowledging the settlement was prior to a patent trial, but after some 
litigation). 
 81. See id. (explaining Upsher would receive a non-royalty non-exclusive license 
to sell and make its generic drug at the conclusion of the agreement). 
 82. See id. at 205-06 (assuming the secondary purpose of the settlement was later 
asserted as primary reason for payment). 
 83. See id. at 206 (contrasting ESI’s multi-layered coating with the patent-holder’s 
single layered coating). 
 84. See id. (explaining ESI agreed to a royalty-free license to begin in 2004 and a 
contingent payment that ranged from six-hundred and twenty-five to ten million dollars 
for ANDA approval). 
 85. See id. at 207 (finding that purchasers who were harmed by the effect of the 
agreement can bring suit). 
 86. See id. at 208 (describing the special master’s presumption that Schering’s 
patent was valid and it therefore had a right to exclude or agree to settlements until the 
patent expired). 
 87. See id. at 218 (rebuking the district court’s use of the scope of the patent 
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the patent analysis and held that the rule of reason should apply for reverse 
payment settlements.88  In rejecting the scope of the patent analysis, the 
court argued that the analysis did not apply any antitrust scrutiny under the 
Sherman Act and was not within the purpose of the Hatch-Waxman Act.89  
Although patent law gave Schering the right to exclude others and license 
its K-Dur patent, the court found it improper to legally assume the 
underlying patent was valid when determining if the exclusionary rights of 
the patent extended to the settlement.90 
Patent validity was the core of the scope of the patent analysis, but the 
FTC’s findings challenged that assertion when the Commission reported 
Hatch-Waxman patent infringement suits have a seventy-three percent 
success rate.91  The court concluded that a generic drug certification under 
paragraph IV of the Hatch-Waxman Act was likely to overturn a weak 
patent and open the market to competitors.92 
Using the rule of reason, the court found a payment to a generic 
company prima facie evidence of a restraint to trade.93  The large payment 
was given consideration for the delay and not to license other drugs as the 
settling parties had argued.94  Upsher and ESI would not have delayed 
entering the market but for Schering paying them millions of dollars in 
compensation for the profit lost by not marketing their generic products.95  
Schering, Upsher, and ESI could rebut the evidence if they could show that 
the payment was not for delayed entry or that there was a benefit that 
encouraged competition.96  Under this analysis, the court of appeals 
                                                          
analysis). 
 88. See id. (adopting the quick look rule of reason in light of the “economic 
realities” in the industry). 
 89. See id. at 214 (dismissing the scope of the patent as contrary to a “long line of 
Supreme Court precedent on patent litigation and competition”). 
 90. See id. (asserting that courts only assume patent validity in a procedural manner 
and not as a substantive right that is conclusive in the law). 
 91. See FED. TRADE COMM’N, GENERIC DRUG ENTRY PRIOR TO PATENT 
EXPIRATION: AN FTC STUDY 16 (2002), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2002/07/ 
genericdrugstudy.pdf (reporting study findings from 1992 – 2002). 
 92. See In re K-Dur, 686 F.3d at 215 (arguing that the exclusionary right of the 
patent is less justified when a possible competitor, who can challenge the patent and 
possibly win, is paid off). 
 93. See id. at 218 (viewing the generic deferral date as an unreasonable litigation 
compromise). 
 94. See id. at 218 (concluding that the quid pro quo for the payment was the 
generic’s agreement to delay marketing). 
 95. See id. at 205-06 (observing that Upsher received sixty million dollars to delay, 
and ESI received between six-hundred and twenty-five thousand and ten million dollars 
depending on FDA approval). 
 96. See id. at 218 (rejecting the defendant’s argument that the payments were for 
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remanded the case to the district court with instructions for the defendant to 
provide pro-competitive justifications for the reverse payment 
settlements.97 
III. ANALYSIS 
The Supreme Court was correct in holding that the rule of reason 
analysis is the best analysis for reverse payment agreements.98  The rule of 
reason should apply because patent law requires a more balanced review of 
patent and antitrust than the inquiry provided in the per se illegal or scope 
of the patent analyses.99  On one end of the spectrum, a per se illegal 
analysis would completely negate reverse payment agreements regardless 
of their benefits to patent law.100  On the other end, the scope of the patent 
analysis is one of many factors used in general antitrust analysis and fails to 
review the concerted actions between patent holders.101  The rule of reason 
analysis does what the other two fail to do: allows a full antitrust analysis 
of reverse payment agreements based on the market effect of the parties’ 
joint agreements.102  Applying the rule of reason, the Court should hold the 
reverse payment agreement in In re K-Dur as an unreasonable restraint to 
trade and a violation of the Sherman Act because it intentionally eliminates 
competition.103 
                                                          
licensing other drugs because the licensed drugs were subsequently abandoned). 
 97. See id. at 209, 218 (finding the plaintiff met its burden, and the burden shifted 
to the defendant to rebut the evidence). 
 98. See FTC v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S.Ct. 2223, 2237 (2013) (holding the rule of 
reason weighs the anticompetitive and pro-competitive effects of reverse payment 
agreements). 
 99. See In re K-Dur, 686 F.3d at 215 (explaining that patents provide a valid 
monopoly, and the court must evaluate the agreement based on the generic 
pharmaceutical industry). 
 100. See Broad. Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 441 U.S. 1, 16 (1979) 
(explaining there was no universal consensus that blanket licensing was per se illegal as 
price-fixing so the facts required a rule of reason analysis to assess the claim). 
 101. See Bd. of Trade of Chi. v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 239 (1918) 
(establishing the scope of monopoly as one factor). 
 102. See Broad. Music, Inc., 441 U.S. at 9-10 (clarifying per se designation 
concludes inquiry while the rule of reason provides the proper background review that 
legal monopolies require); In re K-Dur, 686 F.3d at 215 (concluding the scope of the 
patent does not allow any antitrust analysis). 
 103. See United States v. Singer Mfg. Co., 374 U.S. 174, 196 (1963) (establishing 
the main objective of an agreement cannot be to enforce broad market exclusion). 
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A. The General Antitrust Analysis of Rule of Reason Is the Best Analysis to 
Apply to Reverse Payment Agreements Because It Properly Balances the 
Rights of the Patent Holder with Adequate Antitrust Scrutiny. 
The purpose of antitrust analysis in a patent claim is to ensure that the 
patent is not used in transactions between competitors to eliminate 
competition.104  The patent antitrust claim in In re K-Dur requires inquiry 
into the pharmaceutical industry because the actions of Schering, Upsher, 
and ESI must be evaluated for their pro-competitive and anticompetitive 
effects on the market.105  The rule of reason is the best analysis to evaluate 
the generic drug market because it incorporates many factors that 
holistically provide a reasonable conclusion about the pro-competitive and 
anticompetitive effects of reverse payment agreements.106  Under the rule 
of reason, the reverse payment agreement in In re K-Dur creates an 
anticompetitive effect of eliminating competition while providing minimal 
pro-competitive benefits such as resolving patent infringement suits, 
thereby violating the Sherman Act.107 
1. The Rule of Reason is the Best Option Because It Balances Antitrust Law 
with Patent Law. 
The rule of reason is applicable for reverse payment agreements because 
complexities of the pharmaceutical market require the court’s full inquiry 
in its antitrust analysis.108  The settlement parties have legal rights that the 
court must uphold under patent law and the Hatch-Waxman Act while 
ensuring competition is not hindered in the market.109  On the side most 
favorable to purchasers of drugs, the per se illegal analysis completely bars 
reverse payment agreements regardless of their positive effects.110  On the 
side most favorable to drug manufacturers, the scope of the patent analysis 
                                                          
 104. See id. at 190 (applying the rule of reason when the court evaluated the sewing 
machine market and the course of dealings to conclude the patent license was an 
unreasonable restraint). 
 105. See id. (focusing on the competitors’ agreement to pool their patents and 
enforce each others’ in a concerted effort to restrain trade). 
 106. See id. (evaluating the number of competitors and the market share before and 
after the agreement). 
 107. See In re K-Dur, 686 F.3d at 218 (asserting there were few pro-competitive 
reasons for a reverse payment agreement). 
 108. See id. at 208 (explaining reverse payment agreements are only found in 
settlements under the Hatch-Waxman Act). 
 109. See id. at 217-18 (articulating the balance between innovation and public 
interest that courts must evaluate). 
 110. See Arizona v. Maricopa Cnty. Med. Soc’y, 457 U.S. 332, 344 (1982) 
(explaining that per se illegal distinctions are applied in general application for business 
certainty). 
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neglects the effect on the market.111  In order to provide proper antitrust 
patent scrutiny, all factors must be reviewed to balance all of the parties’ 
interests.112 
The rule of reason analysis is better than the scope of the patent analysis 
because the rule of reason does not favor patent law over antitrust, but 
creates a balance between the laws.113  Specifically, the rule of reason 
incorporates the scope of the patent in question as one factor that should be 
considered together with other factors.114  The court must be allowed to 
look beyond the scope of the patent to evaluate whether the reverse 
payment agreements harm the generic drug industry or help make it more 
efficient.115  Patent law is best balanced with antitrust law because while a 
patent holder may exclude competitors, it may not pool its resources or 
competitors to completely eliminate competitors from the market.116 
In addition, the rule of reason is better than a per se designation because 
there is no consensus in the pharmaceutical industry that the 
anticompetitive effects of reverse payment agreements on the market 
outweigh the pro-competitive effects.117  The rule of reason will uphold 
reverse payment agreements that work as a benefit to the market, while 
rejecting those that are anticompetitive.118  This is a more balanced option 
than per se designation, which completely bars all reverse payment 
agreements.119  Because Congress and others have reviewed reverse 
payment agreements and have not found them to be anticompetitive, the 
                                                          
 111. See Valley Drug Co. v. Geneva Pharms., Inc., 344 F.3d 1294, 1312 (11th Cir. 
2003) (restricting the district court’s antitrust analysis to exclusions that are beyond the 
patent’s exclusionary effect). 
 112. See Maricopa Cnty. Med. Soc’y, 457 U.S. at 343 (articulating that the rule of 
reason requires the fact finder to evaluate all of the circumstances regarding a practice). 
 113. See In re K-Dur, 686 F.3d at 217 (arguing that rule of reason analysis strongly 
supports the line Congress drew between patent law and antitrust law). 
 114. See Bd. of Trade of Chi.v. United States,, 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918) (including 
the relevant business, the effect, and the nature of the restraint in the court’s rule of 
reason analysis). 
 115. See Broad. Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 441 U.S. 1, 24 (1979) 
(maintaining that the license agreement receives more deference under the rule of 
reason because the rule of reason balanced copyright law with antitrust law). 
 116. See United States v. Singer Mfg. Co., 374 U.S. 174, 197 (1963) (explaining 
there are strict limits on concerted actions between patent holders to control the 
market). 
 117. See Broad. Music, 441 U.S. at 16 (observing a lack of universal view that 
blanket licensing was price-fixing). 
 118. See id. at 15 (explaining that per se designation does not provide any flexibility 
in inquiry). 
 119. See id. at 11 (concluding the practice should not be outlawed as a per se 
restraint regardless of the intensive antitrust scrutiny shown to the practice). 
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court must refrain from applying per se designations and instead use the 
rule of reason.120 
2. Under the Rule of Reason, the Reverse Payment Agreement in In re K-
Dur Is a Violation of the Sherman Act Because It Supports More 
Anticompetitive than Pro-competitive Effects on the Market. 
Under the full rule of reason, the reverse payment agreement in In re K-
Dur is a violation of the Sherman Act because Schering intended to 
eliminate market competition.121  To determine whether the questioned 
practice is an unreasonable restraint of trade, various factors must be 
evaluated, including the relevant market, the scope of the patent, the 
parties’ intentions, and the practical effect the practice has on the market.122 
The relevant market is the generic controlled release potassium chloride 
market used for potassium deficiencies because the patent in question was 
the main consideration for the reverse payment agreement.123  Under the 
context of the generic pharmaceutical industry, there are incentives for the 
pioneer drug company to maintain its monopoly and for the generic drug 
companies to delay entering the market.124  The reverse payment agreement 
allowed Schering to maintain its monopoly on controlled release formulas 
and for Upsher and ESI to receive compensation for the profits they 
forfeited by delaying the market entry of their controlled release 
formulas.125 
                                                          
 120. See id. at 24 (concluding the background of the practice required further 
inquiry than per se designation would allow). 
 121. See Singer, 374 U.S. at 196 (concluding the parties’ intention to eliminate the 
market is based on what they did rather than the labels applied); In re K-Dur Antitrust 
Litigation, 686 F.3d 197, 218 (3d Cir. 2012) (finding that the intent for the reverse 
payment was to delay generic market entry to maintain a monopoly). 
 122. See Bd. of Trade, of Chi. v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 239-40 (1918) 
(observing the scope of the rule in question along with the effect and nature of the 
rule). 
 123. Compare In re K-Dur, 686 F.3d at 205 (rejecting the argument that the sixty 
million dollar payment to Upsher was for the drug Niacor, and thus narrowed the 
market to controlled release potassium chloride tablets), with Schering-Plough Corp. v. 
FTC, 402 F.3d 1056, 1070-71 (11th Cir. 2005) (concluding the sixty million dollar 
payment to Upsher was indeed a royalty for Niacor, and thus precluded the generic 
drug from hitting the market). 
 124. See In re K-Dur, 686 F.3d at 208, 218 (explaining a generic manufacturer takes 
over ninety percent of the patent holder’s unit sales after the first year of market entry 
and concluding a reverse payment is prima facie evidence of an unreasonable restraint 
of trade because a reasonable generic manufacturer would not otherwise delay). 
 125. See id. at 218 (explaining a common sense application of the facts shows 
Schering paid Upsher and ESI to refrain from entering the market, which is an 
unreasonable restraint to trade). 
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The Court may look at the course of dealings between the parties to 
determine the true intent of the parties.126  In the early proceedings, Upsher 
and ESI strongly defended their generic drugs as non-infringing and 
Upsher testified that the patent infringement claim was made in bad 
faith.127  The Court could use this as evidence that Schering was in fear of 
losing its patent and therefore created the reverse settlement agreements in 
order to keep its patent.128  However, Schering might argue that it simply 
wanted to settle to free up money and resources to return to creating 
drugs.129  In the case at bar, Schering had more to lose if it lost the patent 
infringement case than if it settled because if it lost, Schering would have 
to split the profits, which were eight-times the amount paid in the 
settlement.130  Thus, its intent was to uphold the patent and its profits 
through the reverse payment agreement.131 
The Court will also evaluate whether the actions could reasonably 
eliminate competition.132  A concerted action to restrain competitors is a 
violation of the Sherman Act.133  Schering signed reverse payment 
agreements with two of its competitors in the controlled release potassium 
chloride market.134 
Whether Schering paid off all the competitors is unknown; however, the 
reverse payment agreements give Schering illegal control of the generic 
market because subsequent generic market entry is cost-prohibitive for 
                                                          
 126. See Singer, 374 U.S. at 189-90 (stating the patent holder’s conversations prior 
to the agreement were evidence of an illegal intent to eliminate competition). 
 127. See In re K-Dur, 686 F.3d at 205 (describing Upsher’s contention that their 
coating contained a different composition than the patented drug, and ESI’s argument 
that their coating was multilayered and therefore unlike the single layer of the patented 
drug). 
 128. See id. at 205 (explaining the Upsher agreement came just hours before cross 
motions for summary judgment). 
129 See Valley Drug Co. v. Geneva Pharm., 344 F.3d 1294, 1308 (11th Cir. 2003) 
(asserting that restricting settlements will increase the cost of patent enforcement and 
harm innovation). 
 130. See In re Schering-Plough Corp., 136 F.T.C. 956, 980 (2003), vacated, 
Schering-Plough Corp. v. FTC, 402 F.3d 1056 (11th Cir. 2005) (noting Schering’s 
internal analysis revealed annual sales were $190 million prior to the settlement). 
 131. See In re K-Dur, 686 F.3d at 218 (concluding the reverse payment was quid-
pro quo for delaying market entry). 
 132. See Singer, 374 U.S. at 190 (concluding the party’s actions had the potential to 
eliminate foreign competitors); Broad. Music Inc. v. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 441 
U.S. 1, 29 (1979) (concluding available alternatives did not eliminate competition). 
 133. See Singer, 374 U.S. at 195 (concluding the competitors market was reduced by 
the illegal agreement). 
 134. See In re K-Dur, 686 F.3d at 205-06 (explaining that Upsher filed its ANDA 
just months prior to ESI filing its ANDA). 
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subsequent paragraph IV filers.135  If a subsequent filer is successful in 
invalidating Schering’s patent, there will be four competitors in the market 
and less revenue for the generic company who was not a party to the 
settlement.136  The decreased revenue reduces the incentive to challenge the 
patent because the generic manufacturer will be less likely to recoup its 
market entry costs.137  Moreover, if Upsher and ESI have a patent on their 
versions of controlled release, the third generic company will have to fight 
and win three patent infringement claims before it could share in a 
saturated market.138  Patent infringement suits further increase the costs to 
enter the market and make the generic pharmaceutical market cost-
prohibitive.139  By making generic market entry cost-prohibitive, 
Schering’s reverse payment agreements eliminate the competition in the 
generic market for controlled release potassium chloride tablets and grant 
Schering full control of the market.140 
3. Pro-competitive Defenses for the Reverse Payment Agreement in In re 
K-Dur Provide Minimal Benefits. 
Schering, Upsher, and ESI will need to rebut the plaintiff’s claim that the 
payments were for market entry delay by providing sufficiently pro-
competitive reasons for their agreement or a showing that the money was 
not for the delay.141  The defendants argued that the payment was a 
                                                          
 135. See United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364, 384 (1948) 
(finding the license agreement illegally eliminated competition by restraining 
production of gypsum products, making it difficult for competitors to remain in 
business); see also Hemphill, supra note 21, at 1583 (referring to the 180-day exclusion 
period as an incentive for the generics to overcome the costs of filing). 
 136. See In Re Schering-Plough, 136 F.T.C. at 980 (stating Schering’s internal 
analysis calculated that total K-Dur revenue would fall to seventy million dollars in 
2001); Hemphill, supra note 21, at 1580-1581 (explaining that profits are reduced and 
spread out across manufacturers when there are more than two competitors). 
 137. See In re K-Dur, 686 F.3d at 218 (concluding the generic manufacturer receives 
the reverse payment to help recoup its cost for manufacturing); Hemphill, supra note 
21, at 1581 (explaining that fewer challengers reduces the rate of the patent being 
found invalid and increases the incentive to settle and pay for delay). 
 138. See In re K-Dur, 686 F.3d at 217 (arguing that reverse payment agreements 
discourage patent challenges which is contrary to the purpose of the Hatch-Waxman 
Act); Hemphill, supra note 21, at 1582 (noting there are a limited number of firms 
capable of challenging a pioneer company’s patent). 
 139. See United States v. Singer Mfg. Co., 374 U.S. 174, 195 (1963) (concluding the 
concerted effort to attack infringers of the combined patents was an unreasonable 
restraint of trade). 
 140. See U.S. Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. at 382 (holding the minimum price setting in 
the license agreement restricted competition because the market was controlled and not 
free). 
 141. See In re K-Dur, 686 F.3d at 218 (finding a reverse payment agreement a prima 
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licensing fee for a different drug and is in accordance with their patent law 
rights.142  While the agreement appears to work as a licensing agreement to 
sell other drugs, a fact finder could logically conclude that the main 
purpose of the sixty million dollar payment was to delay generic marketing 
of K-Dur.143  The license agreement included one other generic drug, 
Niacor, which was subsequently abandoned.144  Therefore, a reasonable 
fact finder could conclude that the main purpose of the settlement would 
pertain to the K-Dur patent and not to license Niacor.145 
The defendants could also argue that their main purpose was to end the 
litigation in accordance with public policy.146  This argument is weakened 
because the settlement came after costly discovery had already 
concluded.147  The court could have found that Upsher did not infringe on 
the patent because the generic drug had a different coating than the 
patent.148  Further, Upsher and ESI asserted that the chemical composition 
of their drugs differed from Schering’s, which would mean a non-
infringement of the patent if properly argued.149 
The agreed upon delayed market entry dates also provide evidence of 
excluding other competitors and giving Schering four more years as a 
monopoly.150  The plaintiff could argue that Upsher and ESI would not 
                                                          
facie case of unreasonable restraint without offsetting considerations). 
 142. See id. at 206 (explaining the major dispute of the parties was the purpose of 
the payment). 
 143. See id. (explaining the drug companies stopped selling the licensed drug after 
the settlement was ratified by Schering’s board of directors). But see Schering-Plough 
Corp. v. FTC, 402 F.3d 1056, 1070 (11th Cir. 2005) (rejecting the FTC’s expert’s 
determination that Niacor was not worth sixty million dollars). 
 144. See Schering-Plough, 402 F.3d at 1070-71 (concluding the main consideration 
for the agreement was to obtain a license for Niacor). 
 145. See In re K-Dur, 686 F.3d at 205-06 (describing why Schering sued Upsher and 
ESI for patent infringement). 
 146. See In re Tamoxifen Citrate Antitrust Litig., 466 F.3d 187, 202 (2d Cir. 2005) 
(stating a policy of courts encouraging settlements). 
 147. See In re K-Dur, 686 F.3d at 205 (explaining the settlement came prior to the 
court ruling on summary judgment). 
 148. See id. (quoting Upsher calling the infringement claim baseless and not made in 
good faith because the products had different compositions). 
 149. See id. (describing that Upsher’s release coating was a different chemical 
composition, and ESI’s drug used a multilayered coating while Schering’s drug had 
one layer of coating and a different viscosity). See generally Andrx Pharms., Inc. v. 
Biovail Corp. Int’l, 256 F.3d 799, 813 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (assuming a generic competitor 
would not reasonably delay marketing its drug). 
 150. See In re K-Dur, 686 F.3d at 217 (stating the purpose of the Hatch-Waxman 
Act was for Congress to provide low cost medicine to the consumer); Kelly, supra note 
1, at 426 (stating the entry of generic drugs reduces the price of medicine, saving the 
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agree to delay market entry if no payment were provided.151  Further, that 
the varying amounts were provided to ESI prior to the agreed upon 
marketing date, but contingent upon FDA-approval, provides evidence that 
the main concern of Schering was to maintain its K-Dur monopoly.152  
Therefore, a reasonable fact finder could conclude that the purpose of the 
agreement was to exclude competition in violation of the Sherman Act.153 
B. Per Se Illegal Analysis Is Not the Right Analysis for Reverse Payment 
Agreements Because Per Se Designation Will Preemptively Negate All 
Reverse Payment Agreements Without Providing Sufficient Inquiry Under 
the Sherman Act. 
Per se illegal analyses are broad-sweeping and, if applied, will 
automatically bar reverse payment agreements in all cases.154  After 
reviewing the practice, surrounding industry, congressional response, and 
the historical impact, a general understanding of the practice is established 
to determine whether all reverse payment agreements are categorically 
illegal.155  The per se illegal analysis should not apply to reverse payment 
agreements because the balance between patent law and antitrust law 
requires more inquiry to properly ascertain the competitive effects.156 
1. Arguments Against Applying the Per Se Illegal Analysis 
To determine whether per se illegal designation should apply to all 
reverse payment agreements and not just the one in In re K-Dur, the pros 
and cons of multiple reverse payment agreement cases must be 
                                                          
public eight to ten billion dollars in drug costs in 1994). 
 151. See Andrx Pharms., 256 F.3d at 813-14 (comparing the actions of the generic 
competitor to those of an objectively reasonable competitor). 
 152. See In re K-Dur, 686 F.3d at 206 (ESI’s “licensing” varied from ten million if 
the ANDA was approved, to six-hundred and twenty-five thousand dollars if not 
approved by the FDA). 
 153. See United States v. Singer Mfg. Co., 374 U.S. 174, 196 (1963) (holding the 
“common” purpose of suppressing competition was a violation of Sherman Act). 
 154. See Arizona v. Maricopa Cnty. Med. Soc’y, 457 U.S. 332, 344 (1982) 
(explaining that per se illegal designation concludes further inquiry under the rule of 
reason once a horizontal price-fixing agreement is found and negates the positive 
benefits). 
 155. See Broad. Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 441 U.S. 1, 10 (1979) 
(asserting that the conditions in copyright and antitrust law must both be evaluated in 
the antitrust analysis to account for both). 
 156. See id. at 20 (holding per se analysis did not apply because the license had pro-
competitive benefits within copyright law that were sufficient to require a deeper 
analysis). 
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evaluated.157  Because the antitrust analysis must balance patent interests 
with antitrust interests and Congress has implicitly allowed reverse 
payment agreements, the per se illegal analysis should not apply.158 
i.  The Underlying Patents of Reverse Payment Agreements Must Be 
Evaluated Because Patents Provide a Legal Monopoly. 
Under the antitrust analysis of the court, the reverse payment agreements 
of In re K-Dur are not per se illegal because the agreements are based on a 
patent that provides a legal monopoly in the pharmaceutical industry.159  
Schering received a patent for K-Dur that gives it the right to exclude 
others from using it.160  Until the patent expires or is found invalid, 
Schering will continue to have the right of exclusion, and the court will 
respect that right.161  However, a per se illegal analysis will preclude further 
inquiry about the manner in which Schering used its patent within that 
monopoly.162  A per se illegal analysis completely negates patent law 
because it only looks at the agreement as it relates to antitrust and fails to 
place the agreement in the context of the patent owner’s rights.163  The 
Court must balance patent and antitrust law by not applying a per se illegal 
analysis but by applying the rule of reason.164 
ii.  Reverse Payment Agreements Possess Pro-competitive Benefits. 
The Court will also look for pro-competitive benefits for reverse 
payment agreements to determine whether they are facial restraints to 
                                                          
 157. See id. at 8, 14, 20 (evaluating the entire copyright industry, congressional 
review, the pro-competitive benefits, and whether the license was price-fixing to 
determine whether the practice generally is anti-competitive). 
 158. See id. at 15, 20 (concluding the license improved efficiency, was used by 
Congress, and there were alternatives in the market). 
 159. See id. at 19 (arguing that licensing agreements based on copyright laws 
provide rights of restriction to the copyright holder that are not per se illegal). 
 160. See 35 U.S.C. § 271 (2006 & Supp. 2010) (defining infringement as using or 
selling any patented material without authorization). 
 161. See United States v. Singer Mfg. Co., 374 U.S. 174, 190 (1963) (explaining 
antitrust does not evaluate the patent holders right to exclude, but rather the agreements 
to exclude). 
 162. See id. at 196 (using the rule of reason to analyze the limits of the patent 
monopoly). 
 163. See In re K-Dur Antitrust Litig., 686 F.3d 197, 216 (3d Cir. 2012) (recognizing 
the analysis must be sensitive to the regulated industry of patents). 
 164. See United States v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364, 390-91 (1948) 
(concluding that using patent licensing to control price and output was beyond the 
rights of the patent); see also Broad. Music, 441 U.S. at 14-16 (finding a practice is not 
per se illegal if it benefits the particular industry under the circumstance). 
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trade.165  A redeeming quality of reverse payment agreements is their 
ability to operate as licensing agreements.166  Typically, a patent holder 
issues a license to a possible infringer to grant the infringer access to a 
particular market in return for payment.167  Licensing allows Schering to 
open the K-Dur patent rights to others for a fee that is then used by 
Schering to recoup its initial investment in developing K-Dur.168  Although 
Schering delayed granting the license to Upsher and ESI, further inquiry is 
needed to determine the harm on the market from this restriction.169  It 
would be premature analysis to find reverse payment settlement agreements 
that are used as a licensing tool to be per se illegal because it would harm 
the purpose of patent law.170 
Another redeeming quality of reverse payment settlements is that they 
provide efficient resolution of patent infringement litigation, and courts 
encourage settlements.171  Patent infringement litigation is expensive, and a 
settlement can bring down the cost of enforcement.172  The Schering-
Upsher patent infringement litigation in In re K-Dur lasted for two years 
before the parties agreed on a settlement.173  A court could reasonably 
                                                          
 165. See Broad. Music, 441 U.S. at 23 (explaining that the court looks for a 
hindrance to competition in the market as a result of the agreement). 
 166. See Schering-Plough Corp. v. FTC, 402 F.3d 1056, 1067-68 (11th Cir. 2005) 
(explaining the Schering’s agreement with Upsher was a license under the patent); 
Valley Drug Co. v. Geneva Pharms., 344 F.3d 1294, 1304 (11th Cir. 2003) 
(analogizing reverse payment agreements with licensing). 
 167. See Valley Drug, 344 F.3d at 1304 (explaining the main purpose of the patent is 
to regulate exclusion). 
 168. See id. at 1304 (explaining the incentive for patents is to induce investment in 
innovation). 
 169. See In re K-Dur Antitrust Litig., 686 F.3d 197, 218 (3d Cir. 2012) (concluding 
a payment in conjunction with a delay was prima facie evidence of an unreasonable 
restraint that could be rebutted by evidence showing otherwise). 
 170. See Valley Drug, 344 F.3d at 1304 (rejecting per se violation of the Sherman 
Act because the patent gave a legal monopoly). 
 171. See Schering-Plough, 402 F.3d at 1072-73 (arguing public policy encourages 
settlements of patent litigation). 
 172. See Valley Drug, 344 F.3d at 1308 (arguing that restricting patent infringement 
settlement will increase the cost of patent enforcement, and discourage innovation). See 
generally Eli Lilly Co. v. Zenith Goldline Pharms., Inc., 264 F. Supp. 2d 753, 784 
(S.D. Ind. 2003) (concluding attorneys fees for prevailing party in patent drug 
infringement case were approximately $1.5 million); Christopher Ryan Lanks, Note, In 
re Seagate: Effects and Future Development of Willful Patent Infringement, 111 W. 
VA. L. REV. 607, 635 (2009) (explaining prior to In re Seagate the costs of an average 
patent litigation case are between one and four million). 
 173. See In re K-Dur, 686 F.3d at 205-06 (explaining that even after litigating for 
two years, Schering and Upsher took two and a half months to work through the 
settlement). 
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assume that Schering wanted to end the precedent litigation and continue to 
remain out of court when Schering and ESI used court-supervised 
mediation to handle their patent infringement claim.174  There would need 
to be more deferential review than a per se illegal standard to determine an 
unreasonable restraint to trade because settlements are a pro-competitive 
benefit.175 
iii.  Congressional Review Did Not Find Reverse Payment 
Agreements to Be Monopolistic or Harmful to Competition. 
A per se illegal designation has also been found inappropriate when 
Congress has reviewed the action and upheld it.176  Congress reviewed and 
heard testimony regarding reverse payment agreements in 2003 and did not 
find the practice harmful enough to amend the statute to outlaw reverse 
payment agreements under the Hatch-Waxman Act.177  Instead of banning 
reverse payment agreements, Congress recognized some beneficial 
qualities to the practice, and left the court to continue case-by-case 
review.178  Accordingly, if Congress implicitly endorses the agreement 
because no harm is found, the court will give more deference to the 
congressional findings and not apply a per se illegal analysis.179 
2. Arguments for Applying a Per Se Illegal Standard That Are Not 
Sufficient 
While the reverse payment agreement in In re K-Dur may be beneficial, 
a per se illegal analysis may apply if the court can determine a clear 
elimination of alternatives in the market.180  In this instance and others, a 
                                                          
 174. See id. at 207 (describing the parties argued that they felt judicial pressure to 
settle). 
 175. See Schering-Plough, 402 F.3d at 1073 (arguing the restraint created by the 
settlement cannot “extinguish competition without creating efficiency”). 
 176. See Broad. Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 441 U.S. 1, 15-16 (1979) 
(deferring to Congressional findings that provided positive findings for the licensing 
action). 
 177. See Judiciary, supra note 30, at 5 (statement of Timothy J. Muris, Chairman, 
Federal Trade Commission) (describing fourteen settlement agreements that had the 
potential to create a bottleneck in the generic drug market); Kelly, supra note 1, at 442-
43 (explaining the amended Hatch-Waxman Act incorporated a provision that requires 
filing of paragraph IV settlement agreements with both the FTC and DOJ). 
 178. See In re K-Dur, 686 F.3d at 217 (holding the rule of reason balances the 
competing objectives of antitrust and patent law that Congress was attempting to 
maintain when creating the Hatch-Waxman Act). 
 179. See Broad. Music, 441 U.S. at 16 (deferring to Congress’ assessment of the 
economic benefit of blanket licensing in copyright law). 
 180. See id. at 24, n.40 (concluding there was no monopoly if alternative forms of 
licensing were available). 
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per se illegal analysis is not applicable because there is no clear restraint on 
the market, and further inquiry is needed to determine the restraint.181 
 
 
i.  Clear Lack of Alternatives: Reverse Payment Agreements That 
Manipulate the 180-Day Exclusion Period May Be Held Per Se 
Illegal 
Under this circumstance, the only clear method of eliminating 
competition is by retaining the 180-day exclusion period.182  The 180-day 
exclusivity right is only given to the first generic drug company who files a 
paragraph IV certification for a generic drug and is lost if the first generic 
filer does not use it.183  In this instance, Upsher would be the first paragraph 
IV filer and have the right to the 180-day exclusion period.184  A 
subsequent paragraph IV filer who successfully invalidates the patent will 
be unable to go to market unless Upsher abandons its right to the 180-day 
exclusion period.185  Retaining the right would wrongly bar all alternative 
generic manufacturers from entering the market and create an argument for 
per se illegal analysis.186 
However, in this instance, Upsher did not retain the 180-day exclusion 
period, and other generic manufacturers could possibly market their drug 
upon approval from the FDA.187  The Court would need to do further 
inquiry on the effect of the reverse payment agreement to determine the 
size of the market and whether Schering illegally eliminated the 
                                                          
 181. See id. at 20 (concluding the license agreement did not plainly show an 
unreasonable restraint). 
 182. See In re Ciprofloxacin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litig., 544 F.3d 1323, 1340 
(Fed. Cir. 2008) (asserting that a crucial factor in finding no antitrust claim was that the 
180-day exclusion right was not retained, thus allowing other generic manufacturers to 
challenge the patent in that time). 
 183. See id. at 1328 (explaining the 180-day exclusion period is triggered when the 
first ANDA filer begins to market the drug or when a final court order finds the patent 
is invalid). See generally Kelly, supra note 1, at 16 (explaining that the FDA must wait 
until the 180-day exclusivity period to approve a subsequent ANDA). 
 184. See In re K-Dur Antitrust Litig., 686 F.3d 197, 205 (3d Cir. 2012) (noting that 
Upsher filed in August 1995 whereas ESI filed in December 1995). 
 185. See In re Ciprofloxacin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litig., 544 F.3d at 1335 
(finding anticompetitive effects when the first ANDA filer agrees not to market and not 
to relinquish the 180-day exclusion period). 
 186. See Broad. Music, 441 U.S. at 24 (weighing the presence of available 
alternatives as a factor that can negate per se illegality). 
 187. See In re K-Dur, 686 F.3d at 211 (stating the Schering-Upsher agreement did 
not involve bottlenecking by manipulating the 180-day exclusivity period). 
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competition.188  Therefore, per se illegal analysis is not appropriate for 
reverse payment agreements because all reverse payment agreements do 
not clearly eliminate competition by manipulating the 180-day exclusion 
period.189 
ii.  Reverse Payment Agreements Are Similar to Horizontal Price-
Fixing, but Too Attenuated. 
Reverse payment agreements should not be analogized to horizontal 
price-fixing and deemed per se illegal for controlling pricing.190  The K-
Dur reverse payment agreement ensured that Schering’s drug remained the 
only one on the market, and thus would have complete control of the 
price.191  Schering’s patent does not grant the right to control the price of 
K-Dur but merely the right to exclude others from selling generic versions 
of it.192  Although Schering eliminated two competitors from the market, 
further inquiry is needed to determine whether all competitors were 
eliminated so as to give Schering control of the K-Dur market price.193  
Schering’s actions are not a literal example of price-fixing, and therefore 
require further inquiry into the K-Dur market, which is not applicable to a 
per se illegal analysis.194 
iii.  Historical Negative Impact on the Market Needs Further Review. 
Lastly, reverse payment agreements fail to clearly establish an 
unreasonable restraint to trade.195  The history of reverse payment 
                                                          
 188. See Broad. Music, 441 U.S. at 20 (explaining that after further review of the 
blanket license, the Court found the blanket license arose out of circumstances in the 
copyright market and is beneficial in that context). 
 189. See id. at 23 (concluding that not all agreements between competitors that 
effect price are per se violations). 
 190. See United States v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364, 398-99, 400 (1948) 
(holding that the patent holder’s license provision that required a minimum price for 
gypsum products was price-fixing, and per se illegal). 
 191. See In re Cardizem CD Antitrust Litig., 332 F.3d 896, 907 (6th Cir. 2003) 
(holding reverse payment agreements as a horizontal agreement to fix the price because 
the agreement eliminated the only competition in the market). 
 192. See U.S. Gypsum, 333 U.S. at 400 (explaining that patent holders can use their 
patent to exclude at varying degrees, but cannot use their patents to monopolize an 
industry through price control). 
 193. See Broad. Music, 441 U.S. at 23-24 (holding per se illegal analysis was not 
applicable because buyers had other price options). 
 194. See U.S. Gypsum, 333 U.S. at 400 (holding that placing a minimum price in the 
licensing agreement between all the competitors was a clear example of price-fixing). 
 195. See Arizona v. Maricopa Cnty. Med. Soc’y, 457 U.S. 332, 344, (1982) 
(explaining that a history of negative experience with the activity may warrant 
classification as a per se violation). 
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agreements, similar to the one in In re K-Dur, establishes that an 
overwhelming number of reverse payment agreements unreasonably 
restrain trade.196  Precedent shows that reverse payment agreements that 
manipulate the 180-day exclusion period typically restrain trade, but these 
are not found in every reverse payment agreement such as the case at 
bar.197 
In conclusion, reverse payment agreements that do not manipulate the 
180-day exclusion period are not facial restraints to competition because 
there is no clear restraint on trade.198  Without a clear restraint on trade, the 
rule of reason should be used to determine whether the pro-competitive 
benefits outweigh the anticompetitive effects and to determine if there are 
alternatives in the market.199  Because reverse payment agreements are not 
facial restraints to competition and Congress has allowed them to remain, 
the per se illegal analysis for antitrust does not apply.200 
C. The Scope of the Patent Standard is the Least Appropriate Analysis for 
Reverse Payment Antitrust Claims Because It Preemptively Favors Reverse 
Payment Agreements Without Providing a Sufficient Inquiry Under the 
Sherman Act. 
When the Eleventh Circuit created the scope of the patent analysis, it 
incorrectly prioritized patent law concerns over the general aims of 
antitrust.201  The Hatch-Waxman Act was proposed as a compromise that 
                                                          
 196. See id. (explaining that repeatedly inquiring into the market effects of a 
frequent business practice is a significant endeavor that courts attempt to reduce by 
applying per se rules). 
 197. See In re Ciprofloxacin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litig., 544 F.3d 1323, 1339 
(Fed. Cir. 2008) (concluding that refusing to relinquish the 180-day exclusivity right 
while agreeing to delay marketing may be found anticompetitive); Andrx Pharms., Inc. 
v. Biovail Corp. Int’l, 256 F.3d 799, 811 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (holding that the 180-day 
exclusion period could reasonably be viewed as an attempt to maintain a monopoly). 
 198. See Broad. Music, 441 U.S. at 24 (holding that price setting of licensing fees 
required further review than per se designation required); Valley Drug Co. v. Geneva 
Pharms., Inc.,  344 F.3d 1294, 1304 (2003) (arguing that patent law creates an 
exclusionary right and agreements with patents should be analyzed further within the 
context of the exclusionary right). 
 199. See In re K-Dur Antitrust Litig., 686 F.3d 197, 217 (3d Cir. 2012) (asserting 
that applying the rule of reason does not discourage settlements which are a pro-
competitive benefit); see also Kelly, supra note 1, at 431 (describing a reverse payment 
agreement that did not allow the generic drug company to market its drug until the 
patent expired, thus providing a patent monopoly extension of at least 180-days). 
 200. See Broad. Music, 441 U.S. at 24 (concluding the unique factors in the 
copyright industry preclude the blanket license from appearing as a facial restraint to 
trade). 
 201. See In re K-Dur, 686 F.3d at 214 (taking issue with the presumption of patent 
validity in using the scope of the patent analysis without evaluating the other factors in 
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would balance the patent rights of pioneer drug companies with the need 
for generic drug competition.202  Congress wanted to allow generic 
companies to file a paragraph IV certificate to legally enter the market and 
challenge weak patents.203  The scope of the patent harms this balance by 
asserting patent law interests over any antitrust claim.204 
1. Scope of the Patent Analysis Favors Reverse Payment Agreements 
Regardless of Patent Validity. 
When Schering filed an infringement suit, it asserted its patent was valid, 
but this is a legal conclusion that can only be legally presumed in non-
infringement claims upon successful defense of the patent validity.205  In 
the course of determining the scope of the patent, the Court should not 
legally conclude the patent is valid.206  The validity presumption rejects the 
purpose of the patent infringement case in determining whether the pioneer 
drug company’s rights have been infringed.207  Considering that reports 
have found generic drug companies successfully challenge patent 
infringement claims in seventy-three percent of Hatch-Waxman claims, a 
presumption of validity does not correspond with reality.208  Allowing 
                                                          
the rule of reason). 
 202. See id. at 217 (explaining that Congress balanced patent rights and the public 
need for drugs with the Hatch-Waxman Act that the rule of reason respects). See 
generally Avery, supra note 3, at 175-76 (describing the two policies of the Act as 
encouraging research by pioneer drug companies, and allowing generic drug companies 
to get FDA approval in a cheaper manner). 
 203. See 35 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(A)(vii)(IV) (2010); see also Kelly supra note 1, at 9 
(stating that the Hatch-Waxman Act revised the Patent Act so that filing an ANDA 
under subsection IV was a technical act of patent infringement, thus creating an early 
and beneficial resolution as to patent validity). 
 204. See Valley Drug Co. v. Geneva Pharms., Inc., 344 F.3d 1294, 1312 (11th Cir. 
2003) (citing Standard Oil Co., Ind., v. United States, 51 S. Ct. 421, 425-26 (1931)) 
(confining antitrust scrutiny to provisions beyond the exclusionary effect of the patent). 
 205. See In re K-Dur, 686 F.3d at 205-06 (finding that filing a patent infringement 
suit against the generic drug companies gave Schering a 30-month automatic stay 
against Upsher’s ANDA approval); Stratoflex, Inc. v. Aeroquip Corp., 713 F.2d 1530, 
1534 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (holding that patent validity is only a procedural device and not 
substantive law); see also Ashcroft v. Paper Mate Mfg. Co., 434 F.2d 910, 914 (9th 
Cir. 1970) (concluding the patent validity is a presumption that is merely an aid to 
inquiry and does not automatically conclude thought and analysis). 
 206. See In re K-Dur, 686 F.3d at 214 (arguing presumption that a patent holder has 
the right to exclude is misguided where the underlying suit concerns patent 
infringement). 
 207. See id. (explaining the purpose of the patent infringement case is to argue 
validity of the patent). 
 208. See id. (finding issue with presuming a patent is valid because the presumption 
asserts that the patent holder would have won the patent infringement suit). See 
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reverse payment agreements through the scope of the patent analysis allows 
the pioneer drug company to assert rights that it no longer has.209 
Furthermore, the scope of the patent analysis circumvents patent law 
because the reverse payment agreement upholds patent validity where the 
court has determined none exists.210  In Valley Drug, the Eleventh Circuit 
effectively overruled the district court’s holding of an invalid patent when 
it applied the scope of the patent analysis.211  The district court applied 
patent law in the patent infringement claim to determine that the patent was 
invalid, thus denying the pioneer company’s right to exclude.212  The 
settling parties agreed to uphold the patent regardless of the court’s 
ruling.213  By allowing the reverse payment agreement based on its 
exclusionary power, the Eleventh Circuit created a new patent right that 
allowed a patent to be made valid through mutual agreement between 
parties and not by patent law.214 
Patent validity agreements are beyond the scope of the patent and do not 
fulfill the purpose of patent law.215  Patent law was created to grant an 
exclusionary right to a patent holder who met the requirements of 
patentability, novelty, and non-obviousness.216  Patent litigation is costly, 
but provides a competitor and the public with important information as to 
who holds the right to exclude competition through a valid patent.217  
Allowing parties to create a contractual patent for a weak or invalid patent 
                                                          
generally Kelly, supra note 1, at 16 (explaining the FTC study of drug companies that 
took place between 1992 and 2000). 
 209. See In re K-Dur, 686 F.3d. at 215 (arguing a reverse settlement agreement 
allows the patent holder of a weak patent to buy its way out of competition). 
 210. See Valley Drug Co. v. Geneva Pharms., Inc., 344 F.3d 1294, 1305 (11th Cir. 
2003) (concluding the reverse payment agreement was not based on fraud because the 
patent was valid at the time of the agreement). 
 211. See id. at 1308-11 (disregarding the lower courts holding of patent invalidity, 
and applying valid patent rights to the reverse payment agreement). 
 212. See id. at 1305 (concluding the reverse payment agreement was a legal 
agreement based on the patent rights because it was made prior to the patent being held 
invalid). 
 213. See id. at 1300 (stating that although a provision terminated the agreement 
upon patent invalidation, the settling parties did not terminate the agreement until the 
FTC began investigating the arrangement). 
 214. See In re K-Dur, 686 F.3d at 215 (arguing a pioneer patent holder can buy its 
way out of competition and invalidation). 
 215. See Pope Mfg. Co. v. Gormully, 144 U.S. 224, 234 (1892) (explaining the 
public interest in not allowing worthless patents to hinder competition). 
 216. See 35 U.S.C. §§ 101, 102, 103, 112 (2006 & Supp. 2010). 
 217. See Sinclair & Carroll Co. v. Interchemical Corp., 325 U.S. 327, 330 (1945) 
(asserting that courts should still discuss the validity of a patent, regardless of whether 
the patent infringes, because validity has the greater public importance). 
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does not properly reward the inventor for her invention, but improperly 
excludes others within the confines of the Hatch-Waxman Act.218  Non-
party generic companies will have to re-litigate the validity of a previously 
deemed invalid patent, only to receive access to the market later.219  During 
this time, the pioneer drug company has a contract creating a right to 
exclude.220  This result is clearly beyond the scope of the patent because 
there is no valid patent and therefore no right to exclude.221 
The scope of the patent analysis should not apply to reverse payment 
agreements because it improperly bases its analysis on a presumption of 
patent validity and goes beyond the scope of the patent by upholding the 
exclusionary effect of invalid patents.222  The scope of the patent analysis is 
properly rejected because it circumvents patent law.223 
2. The Scope of the Patent Analysis Is One Factor of Many That Is 
Required to Sufficiently Evaluate an Antitrust Claim. 
The scope of the patent analysis is not applicable to antitrust reverse 
payment claims because it precludes further inquiry into the relevant 
market.224  In Schering-Plough Corp., the FTC brought an antitrust claim 
against the same parties as in In re K-Dur, but it came to a different 
conclusion under the same facts.225  The difference was the result of the 
                                                          
 218. See Cardinal Chem. Co. v. Morton Int’l, Inc., 508 U.S. 83, 101 (1993) 
(explaining that dismissing a judgment on a patent that was found invalid creates an 
unnecessary burden on competitors to re-litigate). 
 219. See In re K-Dur, 686 F.3d at 204 (explaining subsequent generic companies 
will be less likely to attempt to enter the market because the 180-day exclusivity period 
is the main incentive for generic companies and is only given to the first one to file a 
paragraph IV certification). 
 220. See id. at 205 (explaining that in the Schering-Upsher agreement, Upsher did 
not concede the validity or infringement of Schering’s patent, but merely agreed to 
delay marketing). 
 221. See id. at 217 (arguing the strength of the patent will be based on the patent 
holder’s ability to pay off competitors, which is contrary to the policy behind the 
Hatch-Waxman Act). 
 222. See United States v. Singer Mfg. Co., 374 U.S. 174, 196-97 (1963) (explaining 
the patent holder has narrow limitations in patent agreements). 
 223. See In re K-Dur, 686 F.3d at 218 (arguing that a patent holder is more likely to 
settle to retain its patent when the patent is weak or too broad). 
 224. Compare id. at 212 (holding the Schering-Upsher-ESI reverse payment 
agreement unreasonable under the rule of reason), with Schering-Plough Corp. v. FTC, 
402 F.3d 1056, 1076 (11th Cir. 2005) (holding the Schering-Upsher-ESI reverse 
payment agreement reasonable under the scope of the patent). 
 225. See Schering-Plough, 402 F.3d at 1065 (rejecting the rule of reason and per se 
analysis because the court regarded the analyses as “ill suited for an antitrust analysis 
of patent cases”). 
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Eleventh Circuit hinging its analysis on a presumption of the patent’s 
validity.226  Schering’s patent validity is a minor factor in antitrust claims 
because general antitrust scrutiny does not centralize itself upon whether a 
patent is valid.227  General antitrust scrutiny focuses on the contractual 
agreement to monopolize and how it affects the market, not whether the 
underlying legal monopoly was valid.228  Regardless of whether Schering’s 
patent is strong or weak, the antitrust analysis hinges on the concerted 
action between Schering, Upsher, and ESI to determine whether an 
antitrust violation has occurred.229  The scope of the patent analysis fails to 
review the agreement and the effect on the market, thus failing to provide 
antitrust scrutiny to reverse payment agreements.230 
The scope of the patent analysis is only one part of the antitrust analysis 
required because it fails to evaluate important factors such as the relevant 
market.231  General antitrust scrutiny requires that factors related to the 
coated potassium tablet market be evaluated as a whole.232  An evaluation 
of the scope of Schering’s patent monopoly is helpful in determining the 
market that the court should be concerned with, but should not be the end 
of the analysis.233  Understanding Schering’s patent scope allows the court 
to focus on controlled release coated potassium chloride tablets and use the 
circumstances to determine how that market is restrained.234  The scope of 
                                                          
 226. See In re K-Dur, 686 F.3d at 214 (asserting the scope of the patent analysis 
relies on an unrebuttable presumption of patent validity that only favors the patent 
holder and is not in accordance with antitrust analysis). 
 227. See United States v. U.S. Gypsum, 333 U.S. 364, 387 (1948) (concluding that 
finding the patent invalid is not needed to determine antitrust liability). 
 228. See Katzinger Co. v. Chi. Metallic Mfg. Co., 329 U.S. 394, 401 (1947) 
(concluding the contract was still illegal regardless of the validity of the patent). 
 229. See United States v. Singer Mfg. Co., 374 U.S. 174, 189 (1963) (explaining the 
antitrust issue does not involve a patent holder’s right to exclude, but rather, whether 
the patent holder has the right to contractually exclude others). 
 230. See In re K-Dur, 686 F.3d at 218 (concluding the rule of reason applies because 
it will evaluate the actual effect on the market and not conclude the analysis based on 
the settling party’s labeling). 
 231. See Ill. Tool Works Inc. v. Indep. Ink, Inc., 547 U.S. 28, 33-34 (2006) 
(explaining the analysis for patent antitrust claims evaluates the concerted effort to 
exploit the patent monopoly and increase its effect on the market). 
 232. See Bd. of Trade of Chi. v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918) 
(reprimanding the district court judge for basing his conclusion on an opinion about the 
general activity of bidding for grain, without inquiring into the particular business 
surrounding the activity, thus placing it into context). 
 233. See id. at 239 (applying a three prong test that looked at the nature of the rule, 
the scope of the rule, and the effects of the rule in question). 
 234. See In re K-Dur, 686 F.3d at 204 (explaining that the patent covers controlled-
release potassium chloride tablets). 
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the patent analysis fails to acknowledge one of the most important parts of 
antitrust principles: the actual effect on the market.235 
IV. POLICY RECOMMENDATION 
Although some reverse payment agreements may be found legal, as a 
policy consideration, they should be banned because they undermine the 
purpose of the Hatch-Waxman Act.236  A major underlying purpose of the 
Hatch-Waxman Act is to reduce the generic manufacturer’s cost of FDA 
approval so that competition can thrive.237  Allowing reverse payment 
agreements negates this purpose because the generic manufacturers are no 
longer entering the market and competition is restrained.238  Reverse 
payment agreements place the market at pre-Hatch-Waxman Act levels by 
allowing the pioneer manufacturers to maintain their monopolies on weak 
or narrow patents.239  A monopoly in the pharmaceutical market where 
generic manufacturers are present, but not marketing, is contrary to the 
purpose of the Hatch-Waxman Act, and therefore, reverse payment 
agreements should be banned.240 
Reverse payment agreements also negate the ultimate purpose of the 
Hatch-Waxman Act by restricting pharmaceutical drug access to the 
public.241  Congress hoped to reduce pharmaceutical costs to the public by 
allowing generic drug entry that would create competition.242  The increase 
in competition would force competitors to lower the drug price and the 
                                                          
 235. Compare Schering-Plough Corp. v. FTC, 402 F.3d 1056, 1076 (11th Cir. 2005) 
(concluding under the scope of the patent analysis that the payments from Schering to 
Upsher were to license a different patent as stated by the settling parties), with In re K-
Dur, 686 F.3d at 218 (concluding that under the rule of reason,the payment was for 
delaying because no reasonable generic manufacturer would delay going to market 
were they not paid). 
 236. See Hemphill, supra note 21, at 1614 (stating Congress used the Act to balance 
innovation with competition). 
 237. See Kelly, supra note 1, at 420 (explaining that the Act resolved years of 
controversy over FDA approval requirements for generic pharmaceutical 
manufacturers). 
 238. See In re K-Dur, 686 F.3d at 217 (explaining Congress wanted to encourage 
generic manufacturers to challenge patented drugs). 
 239. See id. (asserting that the pioneer manufacturer is able to maintain its patent 
based on the strength of its wallet). 
 240. See id. (calling reverse payment agreements a form of “self- help” that was not 
conceived of by Congress when originally passing the Hatch-Waxman Act). 
 241. See id. (declaring that Congress sought to protect the public from high 
pharmaceutical costs). 
 242. See Kelly, supra note 1, at 426 (explaining the generic industry filled more than 
fifty-three percent of the 2004 prescriptions). 
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public would reap the benefits.243  Allowing reverse payment agreements 
maintains the status quo in the market, and the public does not receive 
cheaper drugs.244  The only ones who benefit in a reverse payment 
agreement are the manufacturers, while the reduced cost to the public is 
lost.245 
In order to reconcile the competitive purpose of the Hatch-Waxman Act 
with reality, Congress should ban reverse payment agreements for their 
restraint on competition and the harm to the American people.246 
V.  CONCLUSION 
When the United States Supreme Court considered the issue in a 
precedent sister case, it was able to state a single clear standard of analysis 
to balance the country’s antitrust law with respect to reverse payment 
agreements under the Hatch-Waxman Act.247  The Court upheld the rule of 
reason analysis, finding that the rule of reason is applicable to reverse 
payment agreements because the legal monopolies created by patent law 
and the Hatch-Waxman Act require further review of the facts.248  This 
paper agrees that courts must fully examine the facts surrounding industry 
factors on a case-by-case basis, while adding that if a reverse payment 
agreement attempts to manipulate the 180-day exclusivity period, it is 
presumptively anticompetitive.249  If such manipulation is found, the Court 
                                                          
 243. See id. (explaining that market entry by the first generic manufacturer reduces 
the price by five percent, but the second generic manufacturer to enter the market 
reduces the price by fifty percent). 
 244. See id. (explaining consumers saved eight to ten billion dollars in 1994 when 
generic manufacturers entered the market). 
 245. See In re K-Dur, 686 F.3d at 217 (arguing that reverse payment agreements are 
good policy for pharmaceutical manufacturers, but bad for consumers). 
 246. See Hemphill, supra note 21, at 1622-23 (requesting Congress provide clear 
guidance to the court in reverse payment agreements). 
 247. See FTC v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S.Ct. 2223, 2238 (2013) (holding the rule of 
reason was the appropriate analysis); In re K-Dur, 686 F.3d at 210-14 (noting that the 
D.C. Circuit has applied rule of reason, the Sixth Circuit applied per se designation, 
and the Eleventh, Second, and Federal Circuits applied the scope of the patent 
analysis). 
 248. See Actavis, 133 S.Ct. at 2237 (concluding the anticompetitive effect of a 
reverse payment agreement depends on individual factors regarding the payment); 
Broad. Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 441 U.S. 1, 19 (1979) (concluding 
the rule of reason applies to license monopolies because the agreement could have 
procompetitive benefits in the context of the legal monopoly created by copyright 
laws). 
 249. See In re Ciprofloxacin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litig., 544 F.3d 1323, 1339 
(Fed. Cir. 2008) (concluding that manipulating the 180-day exclusivity period typically 
results in a bottleneck on the generic market entry and is a violation of Sherman Act). 
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should then apply the per se illegal analysis because experience has proven 
that asserting the 180-day manipulation while refraining to market the 
generic drug is an unreasonable restraint to trade.250  As a result, clear 
antitrust law to antitrust claims against reverse payment agreements can be 
established.251 
 
                                                          
 250. See In re K-Dur, 686 F.3d at 218 (calling for a rule of reason analysis that can 
be rebutted by showing the payment was not for market delay, or that a pro-competitive 
benefit stems from the agreement). 
 251. See United States v. Singer Mfg. Co., 374 U.S. 174, 196-97 (1963) (explaining 
that possessing a valid patent does not make the patent holder exempt from the 
Sherman Act beyond the patent’s monopoly limits, and there are strict limitations on 
concerted efforts regarding a patent). 
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